Theses: “Who was Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn?”: Theorizing the Relationship between History and Cultural Memory - By Evyn Lê Espiritu - Ponoma College

 

THESES' LINK:

 https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1092&context=pomona_theses

 

THESES' LINKS:

https://scholarship.claremont.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1092&context=pomona_theses

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https://scholarship.claremont.edu/do/search/?q=author_lname%3A%22L%C3%AA%20Espiritu%22%20author_fname%3A%22Evyn%22&start=0&context=1652366&facet= 

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“Colonel Mike” The Origins of the MIKE Force in Vietnam

By Kenneth Finlayson

From Veritas, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2009

1965 was a critical year in the course of the Vietnam War. A resurgent Communist Viet Cong (VC) joined with a growing number of North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units to launch a general offensive against the South Vietnamese Army and its American allies. The frequency and ferocity of the Communist attacks were largely responsible for accelerating the deployment of American conventional forces in 1965. The U.S. Army made its role as advisors to the South Vietnamese Army secondary and took on an increasingly greater role in ground combat operations against the Communist forces. U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) also adapted to these changing tactics. SF became more aggressive in finding and fixing the VC and NVA units and interdicting supply lines into South Vietnam. One long-lasting change that resulted from the 1965 VC offensive was the creation of the MIKE Force.

MIKE Force Patch

 

LINK TO READ:

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1laYmz8p_r6hRmlnmyu5n0fftgkaIK_SM/view?usp=sharing

 

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The Vietnam War - The Bitter End 1975

1975

January 8, 1975 - NVA general staff plan for the invasion of South Vietnam by 20 divisions is approved by North Vietnam's Politburo. By now, the Soviet-supplied North Vietnamese Army is the fifth largest in the world. It anticipates a two year struggle for victory. But in reality, South Vietnam's forces will collapse in only 55 days.

January 14, 1975 - Testifying before Congress, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger states that the U.S. is not living up to its earlier promise to South Vietnam's President Thieu of "severe retaliatory action" in the event North Vietnam violated the Paris peace treaty.

January 21, 1975 - During a press conference, President Ford states the U.S. is unwilling to re-enter the war.

February 5, 1975 - NVA military leader General Van Tien Dung secretly crosses into South Vietnam to take command of the final offensive.

March 10, 1975 - The final offensive begins as 25,000 NVA attack Ban Me Thuot located in the Central Highlands.

March 11, 1975 - Ban Me Thuot falls after half of the 4000 South Vietnamese soldiers defending it surrender or desert.

March 13, 1975 - President Thieu decides to abandon the Highlands region and two northern provinces to the NVA. This results in a mass exodus of civilians and soldiers, clogging roads and bringing general chaos. NVA then shell the disorganized retreat which becomes known as "the convoy of tears."

March 18, 1975 - Realizing the South Vietnamese Army is nearing collapse, NVA leaders meet and decide to accelerate their offensive to achieve total victory before May 1.

March 19, 1975 - Quang Tri City falls to NVA.

March 24, 1975 - Tam Ky over-run by NVA.

March 25, 1975 - Hue falls without resistance after a three day siege. South Vietnamese troops now break and run from other threatened areas. Millions of refugees flee south.

March 26, 1975 - Chu Lai is evacuated.

March 28, 1975 - Da Nang is shelled as 35,000 NVA prepare to attack.

March 30, 1975 - Da Nang falls as 100,000 South Vietnamese soldiers surrender after being abandoned by their commanding officers.

March 31, 1975 - NVA begin the 'Ho Chi Minh Campaign,' the final push toward Saigon.

April 9, 1975 - NVA close in on Xuan Loc, 38 miles from Saigon. 40,000 NVA attack the city and for the first time encounter stiff resistance from South Vietnamese troops.

April 20, 1975 - U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin meets with President Thieu and pressures him to resign given the gravity of the situation and the unlikelihood that Thieu could ever negotiate with the Communists.

April 21, 1975 - A bitter, tearful President Thieu resigns during a 90 minute rambling TV speech to the people of South Vietnam. Thieu reads from the letter sent by Nixon in 1972 pledging "severe retaliatory action" if South Vietnam was threatened. Thieu condemns the Paris Peace Accords, Henry Kissinger and the U.S. "The United States has not respected its promises. It is inhumane. It is untrustworthy. It is irresponsible." He is then ushered into exile in Taiwan, aided by the CIA.

April 22, 1975 - Xuan Loc falls to the NVA after a two week battle with South Vietnam's 18th Army Division which inflicted over 5000 NVA casualties and delayed the 'Ho Chi Minh Campaign' for two weeks.

April 23, 1975 - 100,000 NVA soldiers advance on Saigon which is now overflowing with refugees. On this same day, President Ford gives a speech at Tulane University stating the conflict in Vietnam is "a war that is finished as far as America is concerned."

April 27, 1975 - Saigon is encircled. 30,000 South Vietnamese soldiers are inside the city but are leaderless. NVA fire rockets into downtown civilian areas as the city erupts into chaos and widespread looting.

April 28, 1975 - 'Neutralist' General Duong Van "Big" Minh becomes the new president of South Vietnam and appeals for a cease-fire. His appeal is ignored.

April 29, 1975 - NVA shell Tan Son Nhut air base in Saigon, killing two U.S. Marines at the compound gate. Conditions then deteriorate as South Vietnamese civilians loot the air base. President Ford now orders Operation Frequent Wind, the helicopter evacuation of 7000 Americans and South Vietnamese from Saigon, which begins with the radio broadcast of the song "White Christmas" as a pre-arraigned code signal.

At Tan Son Nhut, frantic civilians begin swarming the helicopters. The evacuation is then shifted to the walled-in American embassy, which is secured by U.S. Marines in full combat gear. But the scene there also deteriorates, as thousands of civilians attempt to get into the compound.

Three U.S. aircraft carriers stand by off the coast of Vietnam to handle incoming Americans and South Vietnamese refugees. Many South Vietnamese pilots also land on the carriers, flying American-made helicopters which are then pushed overboard to make room for more arrivals. Filmed footage of the $250,000 choppers being tossed into the sea becomes an enduring image of the war's end.

April 30, 1975 - At 8:35 a.m., the last Americans, ten Marines from the embassy, depart Saigon, concluding the United States presence in Vietnam. North Vietnamese troops pour into Saigon and encounter little resistance. By 11 a.m., the red and blue Viet Cong flag flies from the presidential palace. President Minh broadcasts a message of unconditional surrender. The war is over.

SOURCE:

http://www.historyplace.com/unitedstates/vietnam/index-1969.html

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Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.-Vietnamese Agreement for the Release and Resettlement of Vietnamese Political Prisoners

Marguerite Rivera Houze Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration Remarks on Vietnamese-American Appreciation and Celebration Day Houston, Texas, July 25, 1999

Vietnamese-American Appreciation and Celebration Day on the Occasion of the 10th Anniversary of the Signing of the U.S.-Vietnamese Agreement for the Release and Resettlement of Vietnamese Political Prisoners Mrs. Tho, members of the organizing committee, Mr. Funseth, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am very pleased to have been invited to address you as part of the celebration commemorating the tenth anniversary of the bilateral agreement between the United States and the Government of Vietnam to establish a special program for the resettlement in the United States of released reeducation center detainees and their close family members. I am also particularly pleased to be included in this celebration because it honors the efforts of Robert Funseth, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. It was his dedication, commitment, and perseverance that ensured the success of the negotiations with the Vietnamese government that established the admissions program for released reeducation detainees. As we join together to commemorate this occasion, I would like to briefly review the history of the program for released detainees. The successful conclusion of the bilateral agreement in Hanoi on July 30, 1989 was the culmination of an intensive seven-year U.S. diplomatic effort to obtain the release of these persons and Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) agreement to permit their emigration to the United States. At the conclusion of the negotiations in July 1989, Mr. Funseth presented to the Vietnamese delegation a list of 3,500 former reeducation center detainees and their family members who were eligible for processing for U.S. resettlement. In October 1989, interviews of the released detainees began in Ho Chi Minh City and in January 1990 the first group of former detainees approved for admission arrived in the United States. As you are aware, initially the U.S. focused on those reeducation detainees who had family members in the U.S. or who had been detained more than 5 years in reeducation camps, although we later began processing former detainees with three or more years in reeducation. On September 30,1994, nearly 14 years after the establishment of the in-country admissions program for Vietnam under the auspices of the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), registration for ODP's refugee admissions component was completed. Prior to establishing the ODP registration deadline, the U.S. Government made a concerted effort to ensure that information about the registration deadline was disseminated in both Vietnam and the United States. Extraordinary efforts have been made to ensure that people had sufficient time to contact ODP and request consideration for resettlement. As of today, we have nearly completed the processing of all registered detainee applicants, and their adult children, eligible to be processed under the McCain amendment. Since its inception, nearly 200,000 former detainees and their accompanying family members have entered the U.S.-- ore than double the number that we estimated when the program began in 1989. As we complete the refugee programs based on association with pre-1975 U.S. Government policies and programs in Vietnam, in September we will bring to closure ODP operations in Thailand. In preparation for this event, just this past week, responsibility for the processing of immigrant visa cases was assumed by the consular section at the new U.S.Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City. As I am sure you are well aware, Vietnam is now the 5th largest immigration country to the United States and we anticipate that by 2001 it will be the 4th largest. In 1998, some 25,000 immigrant visa interviews were conducted in Vietnam, and this year we expect the number to reach nearly 30,000. Of course, the forerunner to this sizeable immigration program was the enormous refugee processing programs in first asylum countries as well as the past 25 of ODP. More than 500,000 Vietnamese refugees and immigrants have been admitted to the U.S. under ODP. We have nearly completed the processing of all registered cases, including the reeducation detainee cases. However, please be assured that we have no intention of foregoing the processing of any eligible cases either under ODP or ROVR (Resettlement Opportunity for Vietnamese Returnees) programs. Indeed, we believe we will be able to complete the interviewing of nearly all of these cases before the end of September. Once ODP operations close in Bangkok, any residual ODP or ROVR cases will be processed by the refugee resettlement unit (RRU) that we established at the consulate in Ho Chi Minh City this past January. This unit will be headed by a U.S. Government employee and will be staffed by experienced expatriate caseworkers to help refugee applicants prepare for their interviews. We also will ensure that expatriate interpreters are provided for the caseworkers and INS adjudicators. Initially, the RRU office was established to process Amerasian, following-to-join applications "visas 92 and 93", and any residual ODP cases. In addition to any of these cases, the office will process the remaining previously-registered cases of former U.S. Government employees whose employment history can be verified. We expect to present these cases to INS officers for interview this fall. Though we are closing out ODP operations, we, of course, must not fail to recognize that there are some people in Vietnam who continue to experience persecution. In the future, we intend to focus our in-country program in Vietnam on the protection needs of individuals who are currently experiencing persecution. Our goal is to create a rescue program that will be responsive to the protection needs of such individuals. We all can be especially proud of our mutual accomplishments over the past 25 years as they concern Vietnamese refugees. Working together we have resettled in the United States, both as refugees and immigrants, some 900,000 Vietnamese: 500,000 through the ODP and another 400,000 from the former first asylum countries in the region. It has been a remarkable partnership, one that has saved lives and provided hope. In the case of the reeducation detainees we formed a joint public/private task force to help in the resettlement of these individuals. The Vietnamese community in the U.S.--largely under the leadership of its own associations and the voluntary resettlement agencies--stepped forward to welcome these long-suffering people, extending to them in a spirit of friendship and good neighborliness the kind of assistance and personal support that no government program could alone provide. With your help, these new Americans, many of whom came with nothing, created new lives and made America a better place through their presence. Though I am sure you know better than I about the successful new lives that former detainees have built after arriving in the U.S., I would like to share the stories of just two of the families that resettled in the Houston area. Mr. Lam van Dieu, his wife and three children arrived in 1995. He quickly found a job working as a cook and his wife was employed at an assembly plant. Their three children also found jobs quickly and attended college in the evening. Just 2 years later in 1997 the family had saved enough money to purchase their own home. Currently the family is in the process of purchasing their own dry cleaning business. Mr. Ta Chi Thanh and his family arrived in Houston in 1994. Mr. Ta immediately enrolled in vocational school classes and is now a licensed electrician. His wife attended beauty school and now owns a manicure business; 3 years after arriving in the U.S., the Ta's purchased a home. These are only two examples of what many of the former detainees resettled in the U.S. have accomplished. Their success is due in large part to the support and guidance that you and other members of the Vietnamese-American community provided to the detainees after their arrival in the U.S. As we move into the 21st century, we must continue the welcoming tradition that has been extended to the nearly 1 million Vietnamese resettled in the United States. I ask you to continue to work with us to extend a helping hand to new refugee populations around the world in need of our help. Their resettlement in the United States requires the same dedication and caring that you have provided to your former countrymen. We look forward to continuing our partnership, forged so many years ago, and to working with you to ensure that all refugees resettled in the United States, where ever they may be from, continue to receive a warm welcome to this great country of ours. Thank you. SOURCE: https://1997-2001.state.gov/policy_remarks/1999/990725_rivera-houze.html?fbclid=IwAR0SBGqHtl_LGs7aaYBVqTZBqgGXLyXAVWzQHwCd_2FD2nK3TInbGjArs2k .

RE-EDUCATION IN UNLIBERATED VIETNAM: LONELINESS, SUFFERING AND DEATH - By Ginetta Sagan and Stephen Denney

1982

Note: The following article was published in _The Indochina Newsletter_, a newsletter I edited at the time, October-November 1982. Much has changed in the 16 years since this article was written. So far as is known all of the former South Vietnam government officials and officers have been released from the re-education camps and many have been allowed to emigrate to the U.S. under a special program, called Humanitarian Operation. But many of former prisoners have experienced various problems resulting from their long term incarceration under difficult conditions.  I hope this article might be of historical interest in understanding what these prisoners have experienced; and also in understanding conditions of imprisonment endured by those dissidents and others still detained in Vietnam.    

  - Steve Denney

THE INDOCHINA NEWSLETTER

October-November 1982

RE-EDUCATION IN UNLIBERATED VIETNAM: LONELINESS, SUFFERING AND DEATH

 By Ginetta Sagan and Stephen Denney

(Editor's Note: The following article is part of a preliminary draft of a report that will be issued later this year on human rights in Vietnam. The report is prepared for the Aurora Foundation, of which Ginetta Sagan is the Executive Director.

Mrs. Sagan is a well-known human rights activist who interviewed over 200 former prisoners from Vietnam in preparation for this report. Details of the interviews will be brought out in fuller detail when the report is issued.)

Ten years ago, demonstrations were held around the world to protest political repression and imprisonment in South Vietnam.

Seven years ago, Communist forces completed their conquest of South Vietnam. In June of 1975, the new regime ordered hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese to report to authorities for "re-education". Many are still held in the camps today, but the world is mostly silent on their plight.

"Re-education" means different things to different people. To the Hanoi regime and its more vocal defenders abroad, re-education is seen as a very positive way to integrate the former enemy into

the new society. It is, according to Communist leaders of Vietnam, an act of mercy, since those in the camps deserve the death penalty or life imprisonment.(1). The former prisoners, on the other hand, see re-education from quite a different perspective.

Re-education as it has been implemented in Vietnam is both a means of revenge and a sophisticated technique of repression and indoctrination which developed for several years in the North and was extended to the South following the 1975 Communist takeover. Yet it has largely failed in its effort to remold individuals because the ideology upon which it is based underestimates the power of the human spirit.

In preparation for this report, we have interviewed over 200 former prisoners from Vietnam's re-education camps and examined all available articles from the Hanoi press and the Western press

on the camps. The picture that emerges from our research is of hard-labor camps where hunger and disease predominate, where prisoners are harshly punished for minor infractions of camp rules, subjected to political indoctrination and forced to write long "confessions" denouncing themselves and others for alleged misdeeds in the past.

 Estimates of those still detained in the camps range from 20,000 (government estimate) to 200,000.(2). We know of at least 80 reeducation camps in Vietnam (although some of them may have been consolidated since the prisoners we interviewed were released), and estimate that 100,000 are still in the camps. Those detained include military officers and government officials of the former regime, medical doctors, religious leaders, artists, poets, political leaders and schoolteachers, just to mention a few.(3)

In this article, we will begin with a brief description of the beginnings of the re-education system in North Vietnam, and then examine the re-education camps that have been instituted for the

South Vietnamese since 1975. We will focus this report on the re-education camps in Vietnam, rather than the prisons, of which there are many, because we have much less information about the latter.

The Precedent in the North

According to Hoang Son, a spokesman for the Hanoi regime, the use of "re-education" camps began in North Vietnam in 1961, at a time, he says, when the United States and the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem had sabotaged the 1954 Geneva Accords, and were attempting to incite rebellion among "counter-revolutionary elements" in the North, most notably among former members of the pro-French army and government that existed during the colonial period. Son cited acts that threatened public security, such as "economic sabotage" and attempted assassinations of Party cadres. It was under these circumstances, said Son, that the DRV ("Democratic Republic of Vietnam") enacted on 20 June 1961 Resolution 49-NQTVQH, with the task of concentrating for educational reform "counter-revolutionary elements who continue to be culpable of acts which threaten public security." (4).

The method of implementing Resolution 49 was brought out in General Circular No. 121-CP, dated 8 September 1961, of the DRV Council of Ministers "regarding concentration for educational reform of elements dangerous to society." The circular said Resolution 49 was to apply to "all obstinate counter-revolutionary elements who threaten public security" and

"all professional scoundrels." The "obstinate counterrevolutionary elements," said the circular, included the following groups:

"1) All old dangerous spies, guides or agents, all elements of the old puppet army or administration, former Rangers with many heinous crimes, who received clemency from the Government and much education but who still obstinately refuse to reform and who still have acts threatening public security.

"2) All hard core members of the former opposing organizations and parties, who before committed many heinous crimes, who received clemency from the Government and much education but who still obstinately refuse to reform and who still have acts threatening public security;

"3) Obstinate elements in the former exploiting class and all other counter-revolutionaries with deep feelings of vengeance towards our system always acting in opposition;

"4) All dangerous counter-revolutionaries having completed a prison sentence but who refuse to reform."

The circular also described different categories of "professional scoundrels," including thieves, pimps and "recalcitrant hooligans," all of whom have been "educationally reformed" many

times, but "who refuse to mend their ways."(5) It is evident, therefore, that "professional scoundrels" would mean common criminals, while "obstinate counter-revolutionary elements" would generally refer to political criminals, in the eyes of the government, and those imprisoned on the latter basis should therefore be regarded as political prisoners.

It is also evident, from the description of "professional scoundrels", that these do not include the most dangerous criminals, such as murderers. The system of re-education developed in North Vietnam since 1961, and in all of Vietnam since 1975, is not looked upon by Vietnamese Communist leaders as punishment, but rather as a form of rehabilitation, in which Vietnamese who do not conform to the government's norms are deprived of citizenship rights until they are ready to return to society. As stated in Resolution 49, "All persons given educational reform shall not be considered as criminal offenders who have been sentenced to punishment but during the period of educational reform they shall not receive the benefits of the rights of the citizens."

The system of re-education, according to the circular of the Council of Ministers, is to follow the line of "combining labor and political education," and the regimen is to include eight hours of "productive labor" a day, two half-days set aside each week for "political study," with cultural classes in the evenings. Those who violate camp discipline, said Resolution 49, depending on the seriousness of the violation, "shall be prosecuted before a people's court or sanctioned administratively."

Resolution 49 set the period of "educational reform" at three years, but allowed for early releases for those who "genuinely reform," while stating that those who "refuse to reform" will

have their period of "educational reform" extended. According to Hoang Son, as of 1980 all those in North Vietnam who were interned in the early 1960's for reeducation have since been released (but how many of the released have since been arrested?). On the other hand, he said, there are still "a small number of counter- revolutionary elements interned in virtue of Resolution 49 since the beginning of the early 70's."(6).

Vietnamese Communist leaders argue that the system of reeducation is a humane alternative for those who deserve educational reform but not punishment. From what we have discussed so far, however, the difference between re-education and imprisonment is not clear. The main difference, it seems, is that under re-education, the inmate is subjected to an indefinite sentence, with its length officially dependent upon how well the inmate submits to political indoctrination and "productive labor." If the re-education camps are more humane than the prisons of Vietnam, then it is only in the truest sense of the "lesser of two evils."

Re-education Since 1975

Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements guaranteed the people of South Vietnam the following rights:

1) freedom from reprisal and discrimination against those who collaborated with one side or the other during the war, and

2) democratic freedoms, such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, belief, movement, organization, meeting, residence and freedom of political activities.

The Paris Agreements was proclaimed a victory for their side by the DRV and NLF (National Liberation Front), and its representatives pointed out that several portions of the treaty, including Article 11, were virtually identical to statements made in previous declarations of the NLF, including its founding statement in 1960. While presenting themselves as genuine civil libertarians (despite the police state in the North), while proclaiming that Article 11 was in perfect agreement with international law, including the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, DRV and NLF leaders severely criticized the South Vietnamese government for not respecting the human rights mentioned in Article 11.(7)

When the DRV and NLF launched the 1975 Spring Offensive, leading to the military takeover of South Vietnam, they claimed they did so in order to "enforce" the Paris Agreements. Yet upon taking control over the South, these new leaders did not set about to implement the rights mentioned in Article 11 but rather to permanently destroy them through the establishment of a "dictatorship of the proletariat."

The hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese who have been imprisoned in re-education camps since 1975 basically fall into two categories:

 (1) Those who have been detained in re-education camps since 1975 because they collaborated with the other side during the war, and

 (2) Those who have been arrested in the years since 1975 for attempting to exercise such democratic freedoms as those mentioned in Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements.

In other words, both categories of prisoners are held in direct violation of Article 11 of the 1973 Paris Agreements, an international treaty, and therefore of international law.

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