General NGO QUANG TRUONG (1929-2007)
Ngo Quang
Truong was widely considered one of the most honest and capable generals of the
South Vietnamese army during the long war in Southeast Asia. General Bruce
Palmer, in his book The 25-Year War, described Truong as a “tough, seasoned
fighting leader” and “probably the best field commander in South Vietnam.” General Creighton Abrams, who commanded
American military operations in Vietnam from 1968-72, told subordinates that he
thought General Truong was capable of commanding an American division.
RISING STAR
Ngo Quang Truong was born December 19, 1929, to a
well-to-do family in the Mekong Delta province of Kien Hoa. After he graduated from My Tho College, a French
colonial-run school, Truong attended the reserve officer school at Thu Duc. He
graduated with Class 4 and received his commission as an infantry officer in
the Vietnamese National Army (VNA) in 1954. After graduation,Truong went
immediately to airborne school in Da Lat. Upon completion of parachute
training, he was assigned as commander of 1stCompany, 5th Airborne Battalion.
He helped rebuild the battalion,which had been decimated fighting alongside
French forces at the1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu.
In 1955,
Truong and his unit participated in the operation to eliminate the Binh Xuyen
river pirates who were vying with President Ngo Dinh Diem’s government for
control of Saigon and the surrounding area. For his actions during that
operation, Truong was awarded a battlefield promotion to first lieutenant.
Later that year, after the Republic of Vietnam was created, the VNA became the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).
Truong was
promoted to captain in 1963, and just a year later he was promoted to major and
appointed commander of 5th Airborne Battalion. During that same year, the
battalion conducted a heliborne assault into the Do Xa Secret Zone in Minh Long
district, Quang Ngai province. The operation was in response to the growing
insurgency mounted by the North Vietnam-supported National Liberation Front
(NLF, or Viet Cong). The subsequent attack by Truong’s battalion shattered the
base area of the Viet Cong’s B-1Front headquarters and resulted in the capture
of 160 weapons of all types. During this operation, Truong continued to build
his growing reputation as a charismatic leader who led from the front and took
care of his soldiers.
In 1965, 5th
Airborne Battalion, still under Truong’s command,conducted a helicopter assault
into the Hac Dich Secret Zone in the area of Ong Trinh Mountain in Phuoc Tuy
(Ba Ria) province, the base area of the communist NLF’s 7th Division. After two
days of fighting during which his battalion inflicted heavy losses on two enemy
regiments, Truong was given a battlefield promotion to lieutenant colonel and
was also awarded the Republic of Vietnam’s National Defense Medal, 4th Class.
After the
Hac Dich battle, Truong was assigned as chief of staff of the Airborne Brigade.
In late 1965, he was appointed as chief of staff of the Airborne Division. As
historian Dale Andrade points out, this noncombat position might have stagnated
Truong’s career, but his reputation for bravery and fairness got him noticed by
the top brass in Saigon. General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the South Vietnamese
Joint General Staff from 1965-75, later described Truong as “one of the best
commanders at every echelon the Airborne Division ever had.”
In 1966,
when violent civil disorders broke out in Central Vietnam by Buddhists
protesting military control of the government, Truong was appointed as acting
commander of ARVN 1st Infantry Division in Hue. As a Buddhist, he was
uncomfortable commanding a unit charged with quelling the Buddhist
demonstrations, but he carried out his duties with his customary
professionalism, and Saigon subsequently made his appointment as division
commander permanent.
Truong, with
his usual brand of hands-on leadership, quickly molded the division, which did
not have a very good reputation prior to his arrival, into one of the best
units in the South Vietnamese army. Marine Lieutenant General Robert E.
Cushman, commander of III Marine Amphibious Force in South Vietnam’s I Corps
region, and his principal subordinate, Army General Richard G. Stilwell,
commander of U.S. XXIV Corps, both felt that because of Truong’s efforts, ARVN
1st Division became “equal to any American unit.”
Truong’s
American adviser at the time wrote that Truong was “dedicated, humble,
imaginative and tactically sound.” His performance was noticed by Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) commander General William C. Westmoreland,
who later wrote that Truong “would rate high on any list of capable South
Vietnamese leaders.”
In 1967,
units of 1st Infantry Division under Truong’s command, including the Black
Panther (Hac Bao) Reconnaissance Company, 2d Troop/7th Armored Squadron, and
the attached 9th Airborne Battalion, attacked and destroyed the Viet Cong
infrastructure and a large number of local guerrilla forces of the Luong
Co-Dong Xuyen-My Xa Front in Huong Tra district, Thua Thien province. After
this battle, Truong was promoted to brigadier general.
TET OFFENSIVE
During the
Communist Tet Offensive of 1968, General Truong commanded ARVN 1st Division
during some of the bloodiest fighting of the Vietnam War in the Battle of Hue.
Two nights before the offensive began, Truong, at his headquarters compound in
the Citadel within Hue, Vietnam’s old Imperial Capital, sensed that something
was amiss and put his troops on alert. When the night passed uneventfully, he
dismissed his U.S. advisers but kept his troops ready.
The battle
began at 3:30 a.m. on January 31, 1968, with two battalions of 6th North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) Regiment attacking the old Imperial Capital and 4th NVA
Regiment attacking the U.S. MACV compound in the “new city” part of Hue lying
south of the Perfume River. Truong, whose Hac Bao reaction company had managed
to hold on to the division headquarters compound against the initial assault,
immediately ordered his 3d Regiment, then on an operation north of Hue, to move
to the city. Reinforced by three ARVN airborne battalions, they reached
Truong’s headquarters in the northeast corner of the Citadel on the evening of
January 31. The next day, Truong launched an attack to retake the entire
Citadel and clear the north bank of the river.
At the
request of the ARVN I Corps commander, U.S. Marines were committed to clear the
south bank of the river. On February 4, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment,
reinforced by 2d Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, began fighting house-to-house
to drive the enemy from the area. By February 9, the south bank had been
cleared.
When the
ARVN 1st Division attacks north of the river stalled on February 12, Truong’s
division was reinforced by two Vietnamese marine battalions. Truong also
requested U.S. assistance, and U.S. 1st Marine Division’s 1st Battalion, 5th
Marines was committed to the fight. Together, American Marines and South Vietnamese
soldiers and marines fought house-to-house in a bloody battle to force the
enemy from the old city. On March 2, 1968, the Battle of Hue officially ended.
More than 50 percent of the city had been damaged or destroyed.South Vietnamese
casualties were 384 killed and1,830 wounded, while U.S. Marines suffered
142killed and 857 wounded. As the Battle of Hue was going on, the U.S. Army
suffered 74 killed and507 wounded in fighting outside the city.
As usual,
Truong had performed magnificently, directing his troops in a calm but
charismatic fashion. U.S. Army Lieutenant General John H.Cushman, who became a
close friend of Truong after working with him in Vietnam’s Delta region,later
said of his performance during the battle:“[Truong] survived with the enemy all
around him. They never took his command post, but they took the rest of the
Citadel.”
After the
Battle of Hue, Truong was given a special promotion to major general. In
August1970, following the death of Major General Nguyen Viet Thanh, Truong
replaced Thanh as commander of South Vietnam’s IV Corps region at Can Tho in
the Mekong Delta. In June 1971, Truong
was promoted to Lieutenant General.
General
Creighton Abrams, then MACV commander, had strongly recommended Truong for his
new appointment “without any reservations at all.” Abrams told South Vietnam’s
President Nguyen Van Thieu that Truong had “proved himself over and over and in
all facets– pacification, military operations, whatever it is.”
Truong lived
up to Abrams’ high recommendation. As commander of ARVN forces in the Mekong
Delta, Truong’s strategy was to establish a system of outposts along the border
with Cambodia to interdict movement of communist troops and supplies into the
area. Meanwhile, his three assigned divisions broke into regimental-sized
combined arms task forces and conducted operations to find and destroy the
enemy forces in their traditional strongholds located throughout the region. At
the same time, Truong, scrupulously honest, launched a campaign against “ghost”
and “ornamental” soldiers, deserters and draft-dodgers in the IV Corps zone.
Concurrently, he increased the capability of the Regional Forces and Popular
Forces (local militia organizations) in his area, making them an integral part
of the defense plan for the security of the Mekong Delta.
As one
historian wrote, Truong was “the least colorful but most capable of South
Vietnam’s senior officers” and he did a superb job as corps commander in the
Delta. Truong was nonpolitical; he had advanced because of his skills and leadership,
not because of his political connections. In fact, despite pressure from
President Thieu, Truong refrained from taking sides in the 1971 national
election. This did not endear him to Thieu, who was suspicious of a senior
officer who so actively avoided politics. Despite this suspicion, Thieu could
hardly discount Truong’s abilities as a combat commander. Those abilities would
soon bring Truong into the national spotlight again.
EASTER OFFENSIVE
On March 30,
1972, the North Vietnamese launched the Nguyen Hue Offensive, commonly called
the Easter Offensive. The attacking force included 14 NVA infantry divisions
and 26 separate regiments,with more than 120,000 troops and approximately 1,200
tanks and other armored vehicles. The main objectives of the offensive were
Quang Tri in the north, Kontum in the Central Highlands, and An Loc farther
south in the III Corps zone.
The attack
began at noon on Good Friday with heavy NVA artillery strikes on all firebases
in the I Corps area south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The next day, three
divisions from the North Vietnamese B-5 Front simultaneously struck the string
of ARVN firebases just south of the DMZ that were manned by the newly formed
and untested ARVN 3d Division. South Vietnamese troops, overwhelmed by40,000
attackers and outnumbered 3-to-1, fell back as the North Vietnamese pushed
south. As firebase after firebase fell to the attackers, Quang Tri Combat Base
was threatened and ultimately evacuated in the face of the North Vietnamese
attack. In the bitter fighting, ARVN3d Division was shattered and ceased to exist
as a viable fighting force.
On May 1,
1972, communist troops captured Quang Tri City,the first provincial capital to
fall during their Easter Offensive. The capture of the city gave the North
Vietnamese control of the entire surrounding province. The Communists continued
the attack to the south and the situation worsened. Something had to be done to
stem the attack before the North Vietnamese completely overran the northern
half of the country.
President
Thieu, realizing the dire straits his forces in the north were in, relieved
Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, I Corps commander, who had not been up to
the task of halting the North Vietnamese onslaught. Thieu ordered Truong to
depart IV Corps and take command of I Corps. Truong left his IV Corps
headquarters at Can Tho and arrived in I Corps region at Da Nang on May
3.Historian Lewis Sorley later wrote that the effects of the change in command
were “electric.” Truong’s arrival in the area helped calm the situation; he was
well known and his mere presence gave new hope to the beleaguered South
Vietnamese forces in I Corps.
Truong
quickly took command of the situation. He broadcasted an order that all
military deserters who had not returned to their units within 24 hours would be
shot on sight. He went on television and promised that he would hold Hue and
turn back the Communists. Truong put together a handpicked staff and then moved
his head quarters to Hue, which was beset by panic in the face of the continued
North Vietnamese onslaught. Stabilizing the situation there, he devised a
comprehensive defense in depth to halt the North Vietnamese advance. At the
same time, he initiated a program to refit and retrain the South Vietnamese
units that had been so badly battered in the retreat from Quang Tri. Using new
equipment provided by the U.S., he put these units back together and gave them
an accelerated training program.
By mid-May,
the Hue defenses had been solidified, the situation had been stabilized and the
refurbished units were ready. On June 28, with the help of massive U.S.
firepower – including Army attack helicopters, strikes by B-52 bombers, naval
gunfire provided by U.S. 7th Fleet, and close air support by Air Force, Navy,
and Marine Corps fighter-bombers – Truong launched Operation Lam Son 72, a
counteroffensive with three divisions to retake lost ground. It was a
deliberate, slow and bloody process, but eventually Truong’s forces routed six
NVA divisions to retake Quang Tri on September 16. Many of the fire bases along
the DMZ were recaptured, and by the end of October the situation in I Corps had
stabilized. With the recapture of Quang Tri and the ARVN steadfastness at
Kontum and An Loc, the heart went out of the North Vietnamese offensive. Truong
was the hero of the hour; he had completely turned around the disastrous
situation in I Corps by sheer force of personal leadership.
THE FALL OF SOUTH VIETNAM
Truong
remained in command of I Corps after retaking Quang Tri. As such, he controlled
three infantry divisions, as well as the South Vietnamese airborne and marine
divisions. In 1975, he and his troops would face their greatest challenge. When
the North Vietnamese forces launched a new offensive in the Central Highlands,
the ARVN defenses in II Corps region collapsed in the face of the fierce enemy
attack.
With the
fall of the Central Highlands, the North Vietnamese turned their attention to I
Corps. In anticipation of the coming attack, Truong began deploying his forces
to meet the new threat. Thieu ordered Truong to defend Hue to the death, and
the general went about the process of strengthening the city’s defenses,
preparing to make a stand there. However, a week-long debate with Thieu and his
senior military staff ensued, highlighted by accusations, conflicting orders
and impossible suggestions. During these discussions, Truong was told to
abandon Hue, even though he was certain it was still defensible. As Truong
prepared to execute this latest order, it was countermanded at the last minute
and he was told to hold Hue at all costs. As one observer told a Time magazine
correspondent, “It was like a yo-yo. First, Thieu gave the order to pull back
and defend Da Nang. Then he countermanded it and ordered that Hue be held.Then
he changed his mind again and told the troops to withdraw.”Compounding the
problem, Thieu ordered Truong to release an Airborne Division brigade for
redeployment to Saigon. Truong protested that the paratroopers were needed to
help defend I Corps, but his objection fell on deaf ears.
Confusion
reigned. Truong, who believed he could hold the line at Hue, did not like his
new orders, but he tried to follow them the best he knew how. Unfortunately,
however, the withdrawal from Hue became a disaster that rivaled the one in the
Central Highlands in scope. Seeing ARVN troops withdrawing to the south along
Route1, the people of Quang Tri and Hue left their homes and joined the throng
of soldiers headed south toward Da Nang. When the North Vietnamese began
shelling the mass of humanity streaming down Route 1, Truong’s forces fell
apart. Writing after the war, Truong recalled, “Confusion, frustration, and
ultimately panic began to grip some combat units.” Because of the conflicting
orders, lack of preparations and the collapse of morale, the evacuation turned
into a fiasco. Poor leadership in many units, the disintegration of unit
integrity and the concern over family members quickly led to total chaos.
The
situation in Da Nang was just as bad. South Vietnam’s second largest city,
shelled by artillery from two North Vietnamese divisions, degenerated into
pandemonium as Truong tried to direct an evacuation by sea. However, all order
broke down as panicked civilians and soldiers alike tried to escape to the
south by any means possible, devolving into what became known as Gio Dia Nguc,
“The Hours of Hell.” Da Nang fell to the Communists on March 30. In the process
of abandoning a city of 3 million people, four regular South Vietnamese
divisions disintegrated, two of which were among ARVN’s most elite fighting
divisions, 1st Infantry Division and the Marine Division.
Truong, who
had desperately wanted to hold the line at Hue, was put in an untenable
position by Thieu’s orders and counter orders. As Da Nang fell, he and his
corps staff swam through the surf to the rescuing fleet of South Vietnamese
boats. Suffering from a severe stomach ailment, Truong was devastated by the
loss of his forces, but particularly his beloved ARVN 1st Division. It was
reported that when he arrived in Saigon he was hospitalized for a nervous
breakdown.
A U.S. Army
officer who had worked closely with Truong heard what happened, tracked him
down and arranged for his family to leave on an American ship as Saigon fell to
the Communists. The general’s wife and older son made it to Fort Chaffee, Ark.;
his daughters and middle son fled with a State Department employee to Seattle;
and his youngest son, a 4-year-old who spoke no English, was at Camp Pendleton,
Calif., for several weeks before his identity was established.
After
finally reuniting, the general’s family moved to Falls Church, Va. Once settled
there, Truong wrote several historical studies on the Vietnam War for the U.S.
Army Center of Military History. He and his family moved to Springfield, Va.,
in 1983, the same year that Truong became a U.S. citizen. There, he worked as a
computer analyst for the Association of American Railroads for 10 years before
retiring in 1994.
Despite the
outcome of the war in I Corps and the subsequent fall of South Vietnam, Ngo Quang
Truong’s reputation survived intact. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who served in
Vietnam, wrote in his 1992 autobiography, “[Truong was] the most brilliant
tactical commander I’d ever known. … He did not look like my idea of a military
genius: only five feet seven in his mid-forties, very skinny, with hunched
shoulders and a head that seemed too big for his body. His face was pinched and
intense, not at all handsome, and there was always a cigarette hanging from his
lips. Yet he was revered by his officers and troops – and feared by those North
Vietnamese commanders who knew of his ability. … Simply by visualizing the
terrain and drawing on his experience fighting the enemy for 15 years, Truong
showed an uncanny ability to predict what they were going to do.”
Unlike some
other South Vietnamese generals who had grown rich as they ascended the ranks,
Truong was impeccably honest and, according to one of his close friends, led a
“spartan and ascetic” life. General John Cushman, who worked with Truong in the
Mekong Delta, said that the general didn’t own a suit and that his wife kept
pigs behind his modest quarters in the military compound where they lived in
Can Tho. Cushman further said of Truong, “He was imaginative and always looked
for ways to improve [his troops’]living conditions and family life.”
A humble man
with few pretentions, Truong was an unselfish individual devoted to his
profession. He was fiercely loyal to his subordinates and was well known for
taking care of his soldiers, often flying through heavy fire to stand with them
in the rain and mud during enemy attacks. He treated everyone the same and did
not play favorites; there is a story that he refused to respond to a request to
give his nephew a noncombat assignment only to have the nephew later die in
battle.
By all
accounts, Truong was an outstanding officer who deserved the remarkable
reputation that he enjoyed among both South Vietnamese soldiers and American
military officers. He had dedicated his life to his nation, and in the end, as
General Palmer said, Truong “deserved a better fate” than watching his nation
go down in defeat.
Ngo Quang Truong died of cancer on January
22, 2007,
in Fairfax, Va. Shortly after his death, the Virginia Legislature passed a
Joint Resolution “Celebrating the Life of Ngo Quang Truong.” This singular
honor for a man who came to this country in 1975 was clearly justified by the
sacrifices that Truong made in defense of his South Vietnamese homeland and the
exemplary life that he lived both before and after coming to his adopted country.
Truong is missed not only by his loving family, but also by all those who knew
and served with him. May this warrior who always did his duty forever rest in
peace.
James H.
Willbanks is an “ACG” advisory board member and the editor or author of 13
books, including “Abandoning Vietnam,” “The Battle of An Loc,” “The Tet
Offensive: A Concise History,” and “A Raid Too Far: Operation Lam Son 719 and
Vietnamization in Laos.”
Originally
published in the January 2015 issue of Armchair General.
SOURCE:
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